wiki:RealistOntology

On the DTS terminology editing UI...

From the Association Type field dropdown list, select the type of association (e.g., Broader Than, Narrower Than) you are creating between the concepts or terms.

Those two relationships, Broader Than and Narrower Than, do seem to get a lot of use in, for example, MESH. Since W3C ratified SKOS in 2009, they are grounded in the web at http://www.w3.org/2004/02/skos/core#broader and http://www.w3.org/2004/02/skos/core#narrower .

B. Smith on realist ontology calls this "International Standard Bad Philosophy":

Ed note: wiki pages should be written in community voice; the 1st person below suggests it would fit better in a blog item.

Dr. Smith is the guy that Alan Ruttenberg went to work for/with after we collaborated on that 2009 project. Alan had very strong views about right ways and wrong ways to do biomedical ontologies. I rarely managed to come up from the nitty gritty of coding to grok back then, though I think I share much of his enthusiasm for realism in ontology. I know I like terms that are grounded either in peer-reviewed literature or defined mathematically.

I'm taking a look this week to see if I can get my head around 'continuant' vs. 'occurrent' and such. This section seems to make a good point about using ontology for science:

Thus ISO 1087-1:2000 defines an object as `anything perceivable or conceivable', providing therewith the following Note: `Objects may be material (e.g. an engine, a sheet of paper, a diamond), immaterial (e.g. conversion ratio, a project plan) or imagined (e.g. a unicorn).' [11] Similarly, Wüster's definition of `object' would seem to imply that the extension of the concept pneumonia should be allowed to include not only your and my pneumonia but also, for example, cases of unicorn pneumonia or of pneumonia in Russian fiction.

With this, I believe, ISO undercuts any view of the relation between concepts and corresponding objects in reality that might be compatible with the needs of empirical science (where it is important to recognize that an imagined mammal is not a special kind of mammal).

This is where B. Smith starts to lose me... he's done shooting down all everybody else's work and starts presenting his own...

To this end we need to engineer a shift of focus in terminology construction to particular medically salient entities of a range of different types, including both objects, such as cells or fractures or inflammations, and processes, such as disease histories, rises in temperature, or the clottings of particular portions of blood.

I don't see any sharp line there. An inflammation goes on one side, but a rise in temperature goes on the other?


was reading:

(factoring out of SemanticWeb)

Last modified 7 years ago Last modified on 02/18/11 09:38:37